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Abstract
This article aims to contribute to a better understanding of the competitive dynamics 
in mobile payments markets and the implications for consumers. We do this by 
conducting a comparative review of market structure, competition dynamics and 
pricing in mobile payments markets in three African countries. The results show that, 
where there is a dominant incumbent, tariffs for mobile payments tend to be higher 
and reflect a wider gap between those for registered and unregistered customers. This 
is consistent with the predictions of economic theory in network industries and the 
incentives of incumbent operators to capture or tip the market in their favour, which 
also contributes to reducing switching by existing customers in the market for mobile 
services. 
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1. Introductory remarks on African mobile payments markets
Mobile payments have revolutionised the payments system for consumers in 
a number of African countries, providing a cheap, safe and convenient means of 
transferring money. This is beneficial for competition, as it provides the consumer 
with a cheaper alternative to banks and other financial institutions with a much wider 
footprint. Furthermore, mobile money services have evolved to offer a wider range 
of services, such as savings and credit products, adding further value for consumers. 
The possibility for competition in the provision of mobile payments, in particular to 
bring benefits to consumers, is illustrated by recent developments in Kenya, where 
increased competition in the market appears to have led to falling prices.
However, in some countries, telecoms companies have established positions of 
significant market power in the mobile payments market, in addition to existing 
incumbent positions in the market for traditional mobile network operator (MNO) 
services. This raises a concern that incumbent firms will engage in strategies to 
reinforce their dominance in both markets, particularly given the network effects 
present within and across them. This has been borne out in a number of competition 
complaints against incumbent mobile money providers in different countries. 
Although in the short term it does appear that MNOs are involved in rapidly 
developing adjacent products and services, leveraging the high penetration of mobile 
payments services, a lack of competition in the long term may reduce the incentive 
for further innovation and product development and lead to higher prices.
Three competition issues have been highlighted across Kenya, Zimbabwe and 
Tanzania, which we focus on: firstly, the impact of agent exclusivity on the ability 
of rivals to compete; secondly, allegations of margin squeeze by dominant MNOs, 
who provide unstructured supplementary service data (USSD) infrastructure to 
other potential mobile payments providers such as banks; and, thirdly, the limiting 
of interoperability, for example through higher charges to recipients on a different 
network, to reinforce network effects and maintain dominance. Underlying all 
of these types of conduct is the incentive for a dominant incumbent to maintain 
its dominance in the mobile payments market and the linked benefit in terms of 
inducing customer loyalty in the market for traditional MNO services. 
In terms of interoperability, Motta (2004) (based on Cremer, Rey and Tirole 
(2000)) show that, in a market with network effects, where there are two firms with 
asymmetric market shares, the larger firm will not prefer compatibility with rivals, 
unless its installed base is small relative to potential demand. We extend this model 
to consider the case where firms have symmetric market shares and show that in this 
scenario, firms would prefer compatibility. Our analysis finds that, for the most part, 
these predictions are borne out in the three countries studied. Incumbent firms with 
a large installed base appear more likely to resist interoperability and find it in their 
interest to maintain their own proprietary system and even raise barriers to transacting 
The African Journal of Information and Communication (AJIC), Issue 17, 2016 11
 Mobile Payments in Kenya. Tanzania, Zimbabwe
across networks. By contrast, where firms’ market shares are more symmetrical, they 
are more likely to agree to compatibility, tariffs are lower and tariffs to registered 
and unregistered users are identical. This suggests that, in markets where there is 
substantial asymmetry in market share and one firm has established a very strong 
position, some regulatory intervention may be required in order to ensure better 
outcomes for consumers.
The article is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces the market structure in the 
mobile payments markets in Kenya, Zimbabwe and Tanzania. Section 3 reviews the 
benefits which mobile money has brought to consumers in each country. Section 4 
introduces theory on competition dynamics in network markets before discussing 
three competition concerns which have arisen in the mobile payments markets in 
Kenya and Zimbabwe. Section 5 analyses interoperability and pricing outcomes 
in Kenya, Zimbabwe and Tanzania and relates this to the relevant theory. Finally, 
Section 6 presents concluding remarks, policy implications and areas for further 
research.
2. Mobile money market structure in Kenya, Zimbabwe and Tanzania
Kenya
The mobile money market in Kenya is the most developed in Africa, where it has 
26.3 million subscribers (Communications Authority of Kenya, 2016). As illustrated 
in Figure 1, the mobile money market is highly concentrated, with the dominant 
firm Safaricom enjoying over 70% of the market in terms of subscribers. Recently, 
there has been entry by some new small players, but it seems that until 2014 at least, 
this did not dent M-Pesa’s dominance in the market. Rather Safaricom’s M-Pesa is 
becoming more popular over time, growing its market share between 2011 and 2014 
from just over 70% to almost 80%, suggesting that it is winning most new subscribers.
Figure 1: Market shares by mobile money subscribers in Kenya, 2011 and 2014
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Source: Michaels (2011), Communications Authority of Kenya (2011-2014)
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Figure 2 illustrates that Safaricom is also dominant in the MNO market in Kenya, 
where it had a market share of between 60% and 70% from 2011 to 2014. Safaricom’s 
market share has been very stable, suggesting that little customer switching has 
occurred. Whilst the market share of Airtel, Safaricom’s main competitor, grew over 
the same period, it did so at the expense of other smaller competitors, not Safaricom.
Figure 2: Market shares by mobile subscribers in Kenya, 2011-2014
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Zimbabwe
The structure of the Zimbabwean mobile market is even more extreme than that 
of Kenya.  In Zimbabwe, three MNOs are operating, all of which have a mobile 
money platform. However, the market is heavily dominated by Econet and its mobile 
money platform, Ecocash. Figure 3 below illustrates that Econet had around 65% of 
the MNO market in terms of subscribers between 2010 and 2014, with very little 
variability in market shares. The other two competitors NetOne and Telecel share 
the rest of the market between them. 
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Figure 3: Market shares by mobile subscribers in Zimbabwe, 2010-2014
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Figure 4 illustrates that, even more than M-Pesa, Ecocash is a virtual monopoly in 
the mobile money market. Encouragingly, Telecash quickly gained around 8% in 
terms of subscriber market share on re-entering the market in early 2014,1 however, 
in terms of transaction value Telecash’s market share is much smaller (POTRAZ, 
2014) and Ecocash still clearly dominates the market. 
Figure 4: Market shares by mobile money subscribers in Zimbabwe, 2012-2014
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1  Telecel had initially introduced a mobile money product, Skwama, in January 2011, using a bank-led 
model in partnership with Kingdom Bank. However, Telecel subsequently withdrew the product due to 
concerns that partnering with a single bank was limiting its potential growth. 
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Tanzania
The Tanzanian market is somewhat different to those in Kenya and Zimbabwe. 
Tanzania has a much more competitive MNO market than either Kenya or 
Zimbabwe, as illustrated in Figure 5. There are three players each, with around 30% 
of the market and a few small fringe players.
Figure 5: Market shares by mobile subscribers in Tanzania, 2012-2014
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For mobile money, Vodacom is bigger in terms of active wallets than the other two 
main players, with a 54% market share in 2014 (CGAP, 2014). Thus, although the 
Tanzanian market appears to be more competitive than the Kenyan and Zimbabwean 
mobile money markets, there is still only one large player, which is almost twice the 
size of its nearest rival (Figure 6). 
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Figure 6: Market shares by active wallets and agents in Tanzania, 2014, 2013
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3. The benefits of mobile money to consumers
It is widely accepted that mobile payments yield substantial benefits to consumers, 
not least because of the ability of these payment mechanisms to offer a secure, cheaper 
and more convenient method for people, particularly in poor or rural settings, to 
send and receive money (Klein & Mayer, 2011). This includes the ability to bring 
people that were previously not catered for under traditional payment systems into 
more formal systems of transacting. This contributes substantially to increasing 
financial inclusion. A key component driving the penetration of mobile money 
and electronic payments in general, across several countries, is the ability of these 
platforms to disaggregate, or unbundle, the services traditionally offered by banks 
into less expensive and accessible platforms (Klein & Mayer, 2011; Zollmann & 
Cojocaru, 2015). These developments are especially important in the Zimbabwean 
setting, following the period of economic hardship in the mid-2000s, wherein most 
people developed a significant distrust for formal banking systems and reverted to 
using largely cash-based methods and direct, informal cash transfer mechanisms, 
such as through mini-bus taxi services and travelling relatives or friends (Dermish, 
Hundermark & Sanford, 2012). 
Mobile payments systems largely compete with formal mechanisms offered by 
banks, as well as cash-based and informal systems. The former is a dynamic growth 
area in terms of competition, in so far as MNOs have drawn in people who were 
previously unbanked, as well as some proportion of traditional bank clients. In turn, 
banks increasingly offer mobile banking and mobile money as value-added services 
to their customers, although this relies on the infrastructure of mobile operators. 
16 AJIC Thematic Issue: Economic Regulation, Regulatory Performance and Universal Access 
in the Electronic Communications Sector
Robb and Vilakazi
From a competition perspective, there is clearly some overlap in the customers 
of banks and MNOs in particular, as well as a degree of imperfect substitution 
between these services and informal mechanisms of sending and receiving money. 
A key determinant of the extent of this rivalry is accessibility, for example in 
terms of agents, cash-out facilities and price. Bank services have traditionally been 
perceived to be expensive (Dermish et al., 2012; Zollmann & Cojocaru, 2015), and 
informal transfers less reliable and convenient. Importantly, the parameters on which 
competition between these modes takes place extends beyond price, to aspects of 
quality of service such as safety, reliability, convenience and accessibility. For example, 
65% of respondents in a FinScope survey of individuals in Zimbabwe said that they 
used mobile money largely for sending and receiving money, because it was most 
convenient (in terms of time taken); while 36% considered that it was cheap; 24% 
that the service was trustworthy; with 23% saying that mobile money was the only 
service available in their area (FinMark Trust, 2015). However, to the extent that 
consumers are willing to pay a non-trivial amount for a more convenient and safe 
service relative to informal mechanisms, and in so far as tariffs for mobile money 
are below those of banks, the price level set by operators remains critical and a key 
strategic lever. 
While the data were not available to assess the degree of substitutability at the margin, 
say for a small but significant and non-transitory increase in the tariffs charged by 
mobile money providers (which would bring the price closer to those of banks and 
make it more expensive for those formerly using informal modes), there are some 
insights to be drawn from recent developments in each of the markets we consider. 
Kenya 
In 2014, the Communications Authority of Kenya provided three new mobile virtual 
network operators (MVNOs) with licences, namely Finserve (owned by Equity 
Bank), Zioncell Kenya (a subsidiary of Mobile Decisioning), and Mobile Pay (backed 
by Tangaza Pesa), which allow them to provide mobile money services using their 
own sim cards and without necessarily rolling out their own infrastructure. Publicly 
available information suggests that the entrants have entered into arrangements with 
Airtel Kenya to use their 60% excess capacity (Equity Bank, 2014). 
Most relevant here is the fact that, around the time of this announcement by the 
authority, Safaricom announced new tariffs, which took effect on the 21 August 
2014 (Nleya & Robb, 2014). Safaricom introduced tariffs that were 67% lower for 
transaction values of KES10-1500, while withdrawal fees remained unchanged and 
tariffs for amounts above KES1500 would be an average of 0.8% of the transaction 
value (Safaricom, 2014). This seemed to follow Equity Bank’s own announcement 
that their pricing strategy, upon entry, would be aggressive and seek to undercut, 
significantly, the prevailing prices for money transfer in the market (Equity Bank, 
2014). 
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The fees that Equity Bank has proposed are lower than their own retail banking 
rates on the Equity Bank Ordinary Account product.2 Setting aside the requisite 
opening balance for opening an account of KES400, Equity Bank charges KES150 
for an ATM cash withdrawal; KES100 for an electronic fund transfer (EFT) to an 
Equity Bank account holder; and KES300 for an EFT to a customer of another 
bank. However, its proposed transfer fees for mobile money range from KES1.00 (for 
KES100 transfer) to a maximum of KES25.00 irrespective of the amount transferred 
(Equity Bank, 2014). 
Although low entry price strategies are common for new entrants seeking to gain 
market share and, while it is not clear that Safaricom’s announcement is a direct 
response to the impending entry of rivals, it is significant that the operators have 
presented significantly reduced prices. For Equity Bank and Finserve, the ability to 
offer reduced prices is likely linked to the ability to leverage existing infrastructure 
to connect Equity Bank’s more than nine million banking customers to mobile 
money mechanisms, through Airtel, whilst offering an even wider range of related 
financial services. In the case of Safaricom, it is likely that the new pricing strategy is 
in response to entry and may be geared to capture a portion of the growing market 
and reduce the ability of entrants to gain share. Even if this is not the intention of the 
strategy, it may still have this effect. 
Equity Bank has also announced that it would have access to a network of 11,000 agents 
to facilitate its entry (Equity Bank, 2014), which is due in part to the Competition 
Authority’s intervention on agent exclusivity in the market in 2014, which we return 
to below. Increased access to agents for cash-in and cash-out transactions enhances 
benefits to consumers, as well as welfare to businesses operating as agents.  
Zimbabwe
In Zimbabwe, Ecocash has, on a number of occasions, had to reduce tariffs for 
mobile money, following interventions by both the Post and Telecommunications 
Regulator of Zimbabwe (POTRAZ) and the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ). In 
2013 for example, the RBZ issued guidance to MNOs to enhance interoperability 
with banking platforms and a directive for tariffs to be lowered (RBZ, 2013). 
These measures were recommended with a view to enhancing the progress with 
regards to financial inclusion and a shift to an economy less dependent on cash-
based transactions. In this same period, perhaps linked to this development, Econet 
reduced their tariffs by up to 34% and set tariffs for transfers of less than USD1.00 
to zero (Econet, 2013). At the time, Econet announced that their EcoCash platform 
was up to 50% cheaper than the cheapest alternative; and cheaper by a larger margin 
than bank and non-bank offerings for local transfers, such as through ATMs, credit 
and debit cards, Western Money Union and Moneygram (Econet, 2013). According 
2  Using tariffs effective 1 May 2014. Tariffs available on the Equity Bank company website. 
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to the Econet website:
Econet even compared its service with those of Western Money Union and 
Moneygram, which are by far the most expensive. For example, sending 
$150 locally would cost $5 with Western Union against only $2.45 with 
EcoCash. For most other options available the charges include a minimum 
fee plus a percentage of the amount to be sent which makes it expensive for 
the lower band transactions and complex for the customers. For example, 
if one is to send $5 using EcoCash they are charged only 9 cents while 
TextaCash charges 25 cents and other banks charge as high as a dollar. For 
sending $500, EcoCash charges $4.49 while TextaCash charges $5.20 and 
some banks will charge as high as $6. (Econet, 2013)
Data were not available to verify the assertion, however, it is expected that mobile 
money platforms have, over time, presented a significantly cheaper and more 
accessible money transfer mechanism to the benefit of consumers in Zimbabwe 
(FinMark Trust, 2015). Importantly, for the assessment of competitive dynamics in 
this market, we do not expect that EcoCash could decrease tariffs significantly over 
time, if it was not profitable for them to do. This suggests that margins on mobile 
money tariffs are sufficient to sustain a decrease in price and tariffs are likely to have 
been above a competitive level before a reduction. However, absent detailed price 
and cost data, it is difficult to draw strong conclusions, noting the high likelihood of 
cross-subsidisation across services by MNOs, required returns on investments made 
and common costs. 
Tanzania
The analysis of prices across the markets, in the sections to follow, shows that prices 
for transactions across various transaction values in Tanzania are well below those in 
both Kenya and Zimbabwe ( as will be shown in Figure 12). The growth of mobile 
money is also reflected in the Bank of Tanzania statistics on various payment systems, 
whereby in 2010 and 2011 the volume of transactions made, using mobile payments, 
began to exceed significantly those made using Internet banking and mobile (SMS) 
banking and other forms of payment mechanisms.3 While this is not reflective of the 
value of transactions made, for which mobile payment values tend to be lower than 
traditional banking mechanisms, it does suggest that mobile payments are filling a 
clear gap in consumer demand and thus enhancing consumer welfare, whether due 
to price or non-price factors.
Based on the available data on mobile payments tariffs, the charge to a consumer 
for transferring the equivalent of USD10 to a registered user on M-Pesa would be 
USD0.15 (based on M-Pesa tariffs in 2015), and USD0.17 for transferring USD20, 
which is nearer to the average transaction value of USD20 (CGAP, 2014). The latter 
3  Bank of Tanzania website. 
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is lower than the fee charged in Kenya for the same transaction (CGAP, 2014). Tariffs 
charged for higher value transactions of TZS50,000 (about USD25) in Tanzania, on 
Airtel and Vodacom, were up to five times lower than those available for an EFT 
across Tanzanian banks (Nethope & MEDA, 2013). Similarly, 51% of households (in 
a sample of 828 households surveyed) used mobile money for delivery of remittances 
(any provider) at an inclusive cost (median) of TZS1500 (about USD0.96 at the 
time of the study) to send a median amount of TZS38 375 (InterMedia, 2013). For a 
direct deposit with a bank (only used by 2% of households in the survey), the median 
amount sent or received was TZS240,000 (about USD153 at the time of the study) 
at a cost of TZS3,625 (around USD2.31). Other things being equal, the median cost 
for mobile money transactions in the study were lower than those for a range of other 
transaction mechanisms, including bank deposits.   
Non-price benefits to consumers are far-reaching as well. For instance, households 
with at least one mobile money user are more likely to make use of adjacent financial 
services, such as savings and insurance products and, overall, are four times more 
likely to send or receive remittances in a period of six months (InterMedia, 2013). 
Consumers also benefit from access to a wide agent network (larger than in Kenya) 
of 166,000 agents, of which 52% serve multiple operators (CGAP, 2014). 
4. Competition issues in network industries: The case of mobile payments
Mobile money markets exhibit both direct and indirect network effects. A mobile 
money product becomes more attractive to customers, as more people join the 
network and it also becomes more attractive to agents, as more customers join and 
vice versa. Network effects tend to increase barriers to entry, as larger networks are 
more attractive to consumers and small entrants can struggle to attract customers. 
They may also cause markets to tend towards “tipping points”, where one technology 
becomes the dominant standard (Anderson, 2010). Such outcomes can still be 
efficient where ex ante competition “for the market” ensures that ex post rents are 
passed through to pivotal buyers, although there may be distributional concerns as 
locked-in buyers are forced to pay more (Farrell & Klemperer, 2007). However, such 
models tend to be overly simplistic and, in reality, there are a number of ways in 
which incompatibility harms consumers and reduces efficiency (Farrell & Klemperer, 
2007). 
A market is likely to be served by a single platform when multi-homing costs are 
high for users; where network effects are positive and strong; and where users do not 
have a strong preference for special features (Anderson, 2010). Mobile banking in 
developing markets has the potential to tip towards a dominant platform, especially 
in situations where a proprietary platform is launched by an established MNO that 
already has a dominant market position (Anderson, 2010). This may be of concern, 
since network effects also tend to increase the opportunity and incentive for strategic 
behaviour by incumbent firms, as entry is already difficult and the benefits to 
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achieving dominance are particularly large (Farrell & Klemperer, 2007).
The emergence of a dominant player in the mobile payments market can result in a 
lack of competition (CGAP, 2012); while dominance in the mobile payments market 
and the market for traditional MNO services, simultaneously, can be mutually 
reinforcing, due to the network effects in both markets. Indeed, it is possible that an 
MNO that is dominant in both markets may seek to leverage its market power in the 
mobile services market, into the mobile payments market, as a means of protecting 
rents in the mobile services market. Mobile payments have proved extremely popular 
in all three of the countries we have studied. The MNOs themselves acknowledge 
the value of mobile money as a means of inducing customer loyalty in the mobile 
services market.4  This indicates that part of the value of the mobile money platform 
is derived from its ability to help the incumbent retain subscribers in the mobile 
services market and to reduce subscriber switching. Furthermore, to the extent that 
the incumbent expects a dominant standard to emerge in the mobile payments 
market, it may have a further incentive to ensure that its platform becomes that 
standard, in order to protect its position in the mobile services market. To the extent 
that the conduct raises barriers to entry and expansion in both markets, which are 
reinforced by the pre-existing network effects, this conduct could result in harm to 
competition and hence to consumers.
Bearing this out to some extent, recently a range of competition concerns have 
emerged in mobile payments markets, mostly relating to the behaviour of large 
incumbent MNOs. Three of the major issues that have been raised are discussed 
below.
Issue 1: Interoperability
A key question in network markets is whether compatibility or interoperability 
between platforms is desirable and whether this is likely to develop naturally, through 
agreements between firms in the industry, or whether a regulatory intervention 
will be required. Katz and Shapiro (1985) consider the impact of compatibility on 
competition. They find that compatibility relaxes competition early in the product 
lifecycle, since the likelihood of the market tipping towards one product is reduced, 
meaning that firms have less to gain from competing hard. However, it also tends to 
intensify competition later in the lifecycle, as one firm is not able to gain control of 
the market. 
A firm benefits from interoperability, or compatibility in the terminology used by 
the author, if the marginal externality (i.e., the marginal network effect) is strong; if 
the firm is to join a large network; and if competition is not increased to a significant 
4  Econet’s 2014 Annual Report for example describes Ecocash as “a key value driver, subscriber 
retention and loyalty product”.
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degree as a result (Economides, 1996). The inherent network effects in the market 
mean that, as a given network grows (for example through interoperability), it 
becomes more attractive to members, meaning that their willingness to pay increases 
and the market price can increase (Economides, 1996). However, interoperability 
may also increase the level of competition faced by a firm, as it weakens the loyalty 
effect of having a proprietary network and takes away its competitive advantage in 
terms of network size. Where the network externality is strong enough, the network 
effect can outweigh the competition effect (Economides, 1996).
Given this trade off, it is clear that the incentive to allow interoperability with 
competing platforms will not be uniform across firms. In terms of the three criteria 
given above, a large firm with more customers will have less to gain and more to 
lose from pursuing interoperability. The bigger the size disparity between firms, the 
less likely the large firm is to have an incentive to agree to interoperability. This is 
confirmed by Farrell and Klemperer (2006) who describe the process of “levelling”, 
where interoperability neutralises the competition advantage of the firm with 
more customers. Thus “a firm with a big locked-in installed base, or a firm that is 
exogenously expected to be big, is apt to resist compatibility with a smaller but fierce 
rival” (Farrell & Klemperer, 2006, p. 86). 
Katz and Shapiro (1994) agree stating that, since markets with network effects are 
prone to tipping, there are likely to be strong winners and losers from incompatibility 
and, if a firm is confident that it will be the “winner”, for example, because it is already 
dominant in the market, then it will tend to oppose compatibility. In addition, if there 
is a subset of consumers who have a preference for one firm’s products and who are 
unlikely to switch, this represents a major advantage to the firm, even when selling to 
consumers with no brand preference (Katz & Shapiro, 1994). In such circumstances, 
the firm with the existing base of customers may prefer incompatibility. 
Motta (2004) presents a model based on Cremer et al. (2000), which analyses the 
incentives for interoperability of two firms with asymmetric networks. In addition 
to the insight that an incumbent with a larger installed base may have the incentive 
to resist interoperability, the model illustrates that, where its installed base is small 
relative to the number of potential new customers in the market, it is more likely 
to gain from interoperability. Thus, it is also important to consider the size of the 
incumbent’s network relative to the total potential market. With a simple adjustment 
to this model, we can vary the assumption of asymmetric networks and assume 
instead that firms have networks of the same size. Under this assumption, the model 
shows that both firms would always prefer to have interoperability (see Appendix 
for further discussion of this model). This suggests that in contrast to the situation 
of asymmetric networks, where firms have similar-sized networks, interoperability is 
more likely to be implemented voluntarily by firms.
In terms of mobile money, interconnection increases the number of potential 
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transaction partners for customers, which should make using mobile money more 
attractive and lead to a higher number of transactions taking place. However, we 
know from the theoretical discussion above that there is another effect to take into 
consideration, namely the impact of compatibility on competition. The discussion 
above suggests that, where there is one large firm, which already has a dominant 
position in the market and therefore a high probability of “winning” the market 
for itself, it may well not have an incentive to interoperate despite the positive 
network effects. On the other hand, if there are two or more networks of similar 
size, then mobile payments providers may be more likely to voluntarily enter into 
interoperability agreements.
CGAP (2011) suggests three categories of possible interoperability, namely platform, 
agent and customer interoperability. Platform interoperability suggests that customers 
can send money from their mobile money account on one network to a mobile 
money account on a different network. Agent interoperability implies the ability for 
agents to serve more than one network.5 Finally, customer interoperability means 
that customers are able to access their mobile money account through any SIM. 
The most common category in our three focus countries is agent interoperability 
although, as discussed below, concerns have been raised in some jurisdictions around 
agent exclusivity and the impact this has on competition. Customer interoperability 
is currently not available anywhere, however, platform interoperability has been 
implemented to a limited extent in both Tanzania and Zimbabwe. In Zimbabwe, the 
smaller mobile payments providers have agreed to link their platforms together and 
use the national payment-switching platform ZimSwitch, without the participation 
of the largest player. In Tanzania, the four main mobile money providers have 
developed and agreed to common operating standards, to enable them to facilitate 
cross-platform transactions, although there is currently no regulatory mandate to 
force the firms to implement the standards and it is a purely voluntary agreement 
(CGAP, 2015). 
An even more limited form of interoperability, where money can be sent by SMS 
to an unregistered recipient, is available in all three countries, but recipients are 
forced to cash out the received funds, incurring transaction costs, which are charged 
to the sender. A means of further limiting the attractiveness of this option is to 
charge higher fees for transactions to unregistered recipients, over and above the 
cash-out fee being charged to the sender up front. This practice has been raised as 
a competition concern by some competitors. For example, Airtel, one of Safaricom’s 
competitors, has complained to the Competition Authority of Kenya about
5  It is important to note that agent interoperability can go further than this, to a model where 
customers of any network can cash in or cash out at any agent, including agents of rival MNOs.
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the differential tariffs Safaricom charges for money transfers to other networks.6 
Similarly, in Zimbabwe, the incumbent provider Econet charges significantly 
higher rates for transfers to unregistered recipients. Such differential tariffs tend to 
exacerbate the network effects inherent in the market, as they make it more expensive 
to send money to any other network. We discuss this issue further in Section 5.
Issue 2: Agent exclusivity
Competition concerns have also been raised regarding the requirement, by some 
operators, that the agents who provide the cash-in/cash-out facility to their 
customers only serve one mobile payments provider. For example, competing 
operators complained to the Competition Authority of  Kenya about the fact that 
Safaricom required its agents to operate exclusively for M-Pesa and did not allow 
them to also deal with other networks (Heuler, 2014). This strategy could be anti-
competitive if pursued by a dominant incumbent with the aim of preventing smaller 
rivals from growing in the market. Exclusive dealing can be anti-competitive if it 
forecloses competitors from a substantial portion of the market and where there 
are scale economies, particularly if the exclusive agreements are of long duration or 
indefinite (Motta, 2004). In two-sided markets with network effects, it is possible for 
a dominant incumbent to sign up one side of the market exclusively and extract the 
full network benefits from the other side, resulting in the anti-competitive foreclosure 
of entrants (Dogonoglu & Wright, 2010).
It is easy to see how this strategy could be used by a dominant incumbent in a mobile 
payments market. By tying up many agents in exclusive arrangements, it can ensure 
that customers have little choice, but to use its platform. Furthermore, the direct and 
indirect network effects present in the market mean that it may not even be necessary 
to compensate agents for agreeing to exclusivity, since, by virtue of its much larger 
installed base, the incumbent’s product is already much more attractive than that of the 
entrant. If the agent is forced to choose between selling the incumbent’s product and 
that of another provider, it is likely to choose the incumbent’s product as it will make 
many more sales. Finally, the more agents sign up to sell the incumbent’s product, 
the more customers are dis-incentivised to switch networks. Thus, unless agents can 
coordinate their decisions, which is unlikely as they are many and dispersed, they are 
likely to all individually choose to sell the incumbent’s product.7
In Kenya, competitors argued that Safaricom’s policy made it difficult for them to 
6  We note that Airtel used a similar tariff structure initially, but later switched to a zero fee structure 
for the money sending component to all networks (withdrawing cash still attracted a charge). 
However, the concern around asymmetric pricing within versus across networks arises when this 
is practiced by a dominant firm with a large existing base of customers, in a market where network 
effects are important.
7  This logic is similar to the theory of “naked exclusion” discussed by Rasmusen et al. (1991) and 
Segal and Whinston (2000).
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compete with Safaricom, which, due to its first-mover advantage, had a far greater 
number of agents in Kenya than any of its rival operators and, arguably, had already 
tied up the most attractive agents in exclusive arrangements. On the other hand, 
Safaricom argued that it had invested heavily in setting up the agent network, in 
terms of finding and training the agents, who had not previously had any experience 
of the concept of mobile payments. It argued that it was therefore entitled to protect 
this investment through exclusivity. 
From an economic perspective, there is some merit in Safaricom’s claim that opening 
up the network would enable newer entrants to free ride on its investment in the 
agent network. However, there is a balance to be struck between allowing the 
incumbent to achieve a return on its investment and allowing it to enjoy supernormal 
profits indefinitely. Eventually, after the matter was investigated by the Competition 
Authority of Kenya, in mid-2014 Safaricom decided to open up its agent network 
to competing providers. Research by the Helix Institute of Digital Finance (2013) 
indicates that this may be a positive development for mobile money agents in Kenya 
as well as for consumers. The study involved a survey of agents in Tanzania, Kenya 
and Uganda; and revealed that agent profitability and support was higher in Tanzania 
than in the other two countries, due to greater competition and much lower levels of 
agent exclusivity. 
Issue 3: USSD as an essential facility/margin squeeze
The final concern raised in relation to mobile payments is the ability of non-MNO 
competitors to access their USSD facilities on fair terms. Access to USSD services, 
which are operated by MNOs, is critical to the provision of mobile payments services. 
In MNO-led models, MNOs own the key infrastructure involved in providing these 
services, but they also compete with other providers of mobile payments, such as 
banks. Importantly, while individual MNOs may have their own infrastructure, banks 
and other providers leverage the infrastructure of the same MNOs to compete with 
them. This increases the likelihood that access to infrastructure that is not offered 
on fair and reasonable terms can place a constraint on the ability of rival providers, 
particularly non-MNO operators, to compete effectively. This may have to do with 
the wholesale price at which access to the USSD services or platform is granted, 
particularly where the price charged is high relative to the costs of providing the 
service and relative to the price which the MNO that owns the infrastructure applies 
in the determination of its own price (Hanouch & Chen, 2015). In some cases, it may 
be that the costs of providing services to other users is higher, due in part to technical 
considerations and the costs of acquiring and maintaining additional infrastructure 
such as servers. However, dominant MNOs may also have the incentive to exclude 
competitors, by decreasing the quality of access to infrastructure and USSD services, 
or charging a very high price. 
These aspects formed part of a complaint raised with the competition authority by 
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banks in Zimbabwe. Econet had initially refused to allow banks access to its Ecocash 
platform making it impossible for bank customers using Econet to pull money from 
their bank account to send via Ecocash. Econet subsequently granted access to banks, 
however, applying conditions of access that were considered unfavourable by the 
banks. In 2014, the Bankers’ Association of Zimbabwe (BAZ) complained on behalf 
of its members about the conditions of access granted by Econet, which included a 
USD0.30 charge per session for person-to-person transactions, whereas the charges 
for access for other mobile banking transactions was USD0.05, or zero, in some 
cases. They also argued that, in order to make a payment, customers were required 
to access a secondary USSD code separate from that used for other mobile banking 
transactions, which inconvenienced bank customers and implied an additional charge. 
Finally, the session times available to bank customers would be limited to 20 seconds, 
whereas those which Econet set for their own clients were wider at 40 seconds. 
The higher charge in this case could effectively be classified as a margin squeeze, or 
constructive refusal to supply. As in the case of Safaricom, the operator argued that 
the additional charge was justified by the costs of servicing additional bank clients.
In 2014, the Kenyan competition authority announced a market inquiry into the 
provision of USSD services covering prices, other conditions of access and consumer 
protection concerns. The inquiry has as its objectives “to assess whether the provision 
and pricing of USSD services leads to constrained competition in the financial 
services market” (FSD Kenya, 2014). While the findings of the enquiry had not been 
released as at November 2016, it is clear that the concerns identified in Zimbabwe, 
regarding the price and conditions of access, are common in markets where rivals 
of MNOs rely on the key infrastructure owned and operated by those MNOs, who 
can face incentives to raise rivals’ costs. However, as noted above, it is important to 
consider the costs and investments involved in providing access to these users and the 
investment justifications of MNOs in charging rates that reflect these. 
5. Outcomes for consumers: Interoperability and transaction fees in Kenya, 
Zimbabwe and Tanzania
In order to understand the importance of market structure and competition dynamics 
on outcomes for consumers, we have conducted an analysis of the likely incentives 
for interoperability and outcomes, in terms of transaction fees in the three countries. 
We consider each country in turn and then draw some overall conclusions.
Kenya
Following from the theoretical review above, we would expect that Safaricom, as by 
far the biggest player in both markets, might have little to gain and a lot to lose by 
allowing smaller competitors to interoperate with M-Pesa. It already has 17.1 million 
out of 26.3 million mobile money subscribers and accounts for 84% of transaction 
value (CAK, 2016) and, as such, the marginal network externality of growing its 
subscriber base further is likely to be much lower than that of Airtel and the other 
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competitors. On the other hand, the M-Pesa network is more than four times the 
size of its nearest rival in subscriber terms (Airtel) and more than five times the size 
of its nearest rival in terms of transaction value (Equitel/Finserve) (Communications 
Authority of Kenya, 2016). Safaricom is therefore likely to be significantly more 
attractive to customers than its rivals. It is likely to already expect to be the “winner” 
in this market, reducing its incentive to allow platform or customer interoperability 
with rivals. Rather than opening up its network to competitors, it may have an 
incentive to maintain its dominance, particularly given the knock-on benefits in 
terms of inducing customer loyalty in its core market for MNO services. Based on 
the number of mobile phone subscribers in Kenya, there are 13.5 million potential 
new customers in the market, compared to M-Pesa’s installed base of 17.1 million, 
which further suggests that interoperability is unlikely to be in its interest based on 
the model discussed above.8 
Figure 7 analyses M-Pesa’s pricing in 2011, 2014 and 2015 at three different 
transaction levels.9 It illustrates that prices for the lowest (and most common) 
transaction values were much higher as a proportion of transaction value than they 
were for higher value transactions until 2015, when the cost of sending USD10 was 
substantially reduced. In 2011, prices varied between 0.5% and 4.5% for the three 
transaction values, but, by 2015, the range had narrowed to between 1% and 2.5% 
of transaction value. The change in pricing structure in late 2014 may have been 
in response to an increase in competitive activity in the sector, with the launch of 
new MVNOs with mobile money offerings, such as Tangaza, and a partnership 
announced between Airtel and Equity Bank (Nleya & Robb, 2014). 
Figure 7: M-Pesa charge to registered and unregistered recipients as % of transaction 
value for USD10, USD30 and USD50 transactions
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on Michaels (2011), Safaricom website
Note: all transaction values have been deflated such that the charges are comparable across years.
8  There are, however, recent efforts to coordinate the various MNOs towards interoperability through the 
Mobile Money Association of Kenya, although this is a very recent development, as of November 2016 and 
it is too early to evaluate its possible effect.
9  In early 2015, the average mobile payment transaction size in Kenya was around KES2580 or USD28 
(Reserve Bank of Kenya, 2015), but the median transaction value is likely to be substantially lower.
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Another interesting point that emerges from the pricing analysis is that M-Pesa 
charges significantly more to send money to unregistered than to registered users. 
Figure 8 illustrates that in 2014, M-Pesa charged between 10% and 55% more to send 
money to an unregistered user. Thus, although it is technically feasible to send money 
to a recipient on a different mobile network, M-Pesa’s pricing makes it unattractive 
to do so. This was the subject of a complaint by Airtel to the Competition Authority 
of Kenya, as discussed above. 
Another interesting development is that, with the recent reduction in prices at low 
transaction values, the price differential between transactions to registered and 
unregistered recipients has grown substantially. This makes sense in terms of the 
theory discussed above. As Safaricom has reduced its prices in response to competition
from new entrants, it has simultaneously increased the charge to send money to 
unregistered recipients, which tends to reinforce its network effects advantage and 
discourage the use of new, smaller networks.
Figure 8: Difference (%) between M-Pesa charges to registered and unregistered 
recipients
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on Michaels (2011), Safaricom website
Note: all transaction values have been deflated such that the charges are comparable across years.
Zimbabwe
In the case of Zimbabwe, even more than in the Kenyan market, one would expect 
Econet to have little incentive to agree to interoperability. On the other hand, there 
are a large number of potential new customers in Zimbabwe as, in 2014, there were 
13.9 million mobile subscribers and only 3.7 million mobile money subscribers, a 
difference of 10.2 million. According to the theory discussed above, this should make 
it more likely that Ecocash would benefit from interoperability. However, in practice, 
although NetOne and Telecel have integrated their mobile payments platforms 
through the national payments switch, ZimSwitch, Econet will not agree to link 
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its Ecocash platform into the system, preferring to maintain a proprietary system. 
One possible reason for this is that only 6.7 million people in Zimbabwe know about 
mobile money, and of these only 45% are registered (Finscope, 2014). The majority 
of those who know of it, but do not use it, state that this is because they either do not 
have money to send, or do not have a cellphone. Thus, in reality, the potential market 
is likely to be significantly less than 6.7 million people.
Turning to an analysis of Ecocash’s prices, Figure 9 illustrates that prices stayed 
largely the same from 2013 to 2015. The appearance of a price fall in 2015 is a 
result of changing transaction bands, due to deflating the transaction amounts being 
tracked. Also, the lowest transaction value is the most expensive as a proportion of 
transaction value. Prices as a proportion of transaction value are high at between 2% 
and 8% of transaction value. 
Figure 9: Ecocash charge to registered and unregistered recipients as a percentage of 
transaction value for USD10, USD30 and USD50 transactions10
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on Econet website
Note: all transaction values have been deflated such that the charges are comparable across years.
Figure 10 illustrates that there is an even bigger difference between charges to 
registered and unregistered recipients than that charged by M-Pesa in Kenya at 
between 40% and 140%. Again, the greatest difference is at the most common low 
transaction values.
10  In 2014, the average mobile payment transaction size in Zimbabwe was USD18 (Reserve Bank of 
Zimbabwe, 2014) but the median transaction size is likely to be much lower.
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Figure 10: Difference (%) between charge to registered and unregistered recipients
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on Econet website
Note: all transaction values have been deflated such that the charges are comparable across years.
Tanzania
The greater symmetry between players appears to have had a positive impact on 
competition in Tanzania, with Vodacom, Tigo, Airtel and Zantel all signing up, in 
late 2014, to a set of voluntary standards, which will govern how cross-platform 
payments work (CGAP, 2015). Tigo, Airtel and Zantel had previously announced 
an agreement to allow interoperability in their mobile money platforms by mid-
2014, which would have created a network of similar size to Vodacom’s M-Pesa. 
This may have made it more attractive to Vodacom to join the initiative than to keep 
its platform separate. Initial indications from Tigo suggest that they believe that 
opening up to interoperability has been a good decision (CGAP, 2015).
An analysis of Vodacom’s pricing suggests that its prices are lower, as a proportion of 
transaction value, than Safaricom’s, or Econet’s, which may be indicative of greater 
competition. Figure 11 illustrates that prices range between 0.4% and 1.6% of 
transaction value and increased at most levels between 2013 and 2015, such that prices 
as a proportion of transaction value are highest at the low end. What is striking about 
an analysis of Vodacom’s prices in Tanzania, however, is that there is no difference 
in the prices charged to registered and unregistered recipients. This may also reflect 
greater competition in both the mobile money market and the broader MNO market 
and therefore the much greater likelihood that a given recipient will be a customer 
of another network.
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Figure 11: Vodacom charge as a percentage of transaction value for USD5, USD10, 
USD20, USD30, USD40 and USD50 transactions11
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Source: NetHope and MEDA (2013), Vodacom website
Note: all transaction values have been deflated such that the charges are comparable across years.
A study carried out by the Helix Institute of Digital Finance (2013) suggests that 
in urban areas, the mobile money market may be even more competitive than the 
market shares suggest. The study found that only about half of agents in Tanzania 
are exclusive and the figure is less than 20% in Dar es Salaam, where market shares 
in terms of agents are relatively more equal between the three main players (41%, 
17%, 37%). They found that agent exclusivity was much more common outside Dar 
es Salaam and in rural areas, where Vodacom has a higher market share in terms 
of agents (Helix Institute of Digital Finance, 2013). This may explain the more 
competitive outcomes that are observed in terms of pricing and interoperability in 
Tanzania.
6. Comparison of the three countries
A comparison of Kenya, Zimbabwe and Tanzania has suggested a number of 
interesting differences in the structure and dynamics of their mobile payments 
markets, which tend to reflect the economic theory of network industries and which 
suggest certain policy implications. The pricing analysis of the largest mobile money 
provider in each country shows that the most expensive is Zimbabwe’s Ecocash and 
the cheapest is Tanzania’s M-Pesa, with Kenya’s M-Pesa falling in the middle. This 
reflects precisely the degree of competition in the three countries, with Tanzania’s
mobile money and MNO markets being the least concentrated and Zimbabwe’s
11  The average mobile payment transaction size in Tanzania in 2014 was USD29 (CGAP, 2014), but 
the median transaction is likely to be lower. The median transaction size (sent or received) found in a 
survey of households in Tanzania was approximately USD24.50 (InterMedia, 2013).  
The African Journal of Information and Communication (AJIC), Issue 17, 2016 31
 Mobile Payments in Kenya. Tanzania, Zimbabwe
being the most. Similarly, Ecocash charges significantly more to transfer money 
to unregistered recipients, compared to registered recipients, with Kenya’s M-Pesa 
charging slightly more. Tanzania’s M-Pesa, on the other hand, charges the same 
transfer fee to registered and unregistered recipients.
Figure 12: Cross-country comparison of charges as a percentage of transaction value 
for USD5, USD10, USD20, USD30, USD40 and USD50 transactions12
0.0%
1.0%
2.0%
3.0%
4.0%
5.0%
6.0%
7.0%
8.0%
$5 $10 $20 $30 $40 $50
M-Pesa Kenya R M-Pesa Kenya U Ecocash Zimbabwe R
Ecocash Zimbabwe U M-Pesa Tanzania R&U
Source: See Figures 3, 7, 11
In general, the predictions of economic theory, relating to network effects and 
compatibility, appears to be borne out in the three examples we have studied. 
Interoperability seems to be more likely to be in the interest of firms where markets 
are more symmetrical and there is not one super-dominant player with a great deal 
to lose from opening up the market. Interestingly, even though there are a substantial 
number of potential new customers in Zimbabwe, the fact that Ecocash is a near 
monopoly seems to have reduced its incentive to agree to interoperability. It may be 
that its expectation of “winning” the market is strong enough to make it certain of 
winning most, if not all, new customers. 
Of concern to policymakers in Zimbabwe and Kenya is the fact that the incumbent 
12  The average mobile payment transaction sizes in Kenya (2015), Zimbabwe (2014) and Tanzania 
(2014) respectively in 2014 were USD28, USD18 and USD29 (CGAP, 2014), but the median 
transaction is likely to be much lower.
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in both markets is in a very strong position, which, far from being eroded by 
competition, appears to have strengthened over the past three or four years. Both 
theory and practice seem to suggest that, in these markets, interoperability is unlikely 
to develop naturally and some form of intervention may be required, in order to 
ensure that there is a level playing field for competition. This is particularly important 
given the fact that incumbents in markets with network effects are more likely to 
have the ability and incentive to engage in anti-competitive conduct, in order to 
protect their profitable position in the market. They are also more likely to engage in 
market strategies that leverage the strong position in adjacent and growing markets, 
to strengthen their position in the primary markets, such as those for traditional 
MNO services. Recent competition cases in Zimbabwe and Kenya bear this out. In 
Tanzania on the other hand, full interoperability between the different platforms 
is already on the way to developing naturally, by agreement between the different 
players. Regulators would still be well advised to monitor the development of the 
market, but there is likely to be less need for active intervention.
7. Concluding remarks
This article has attempted to highlight the benefits and some of the potential 
problems in developing mobile payments markets. Available information on the 
relative tariffs of traditional banking services versus mobile money suggest that 
mobile payments are a significantly cheaper method of sending and receiving money. 
However, it is also clear that non-price factors in favour of mobile payments as a 
mode of transacting, such as convenience, accessibility, safety and reliability, are just 
as important, if not more so. Rivalry between operators, in this regard, can take place 
through tariffs charged, but also through the size and footprint of the operator’s agent 
network and the range and quality of services offered. In each of these areas, various 
competition complaints have been raised in the three countries studied, including on 
agent exclusivity, prices and access charges.
Experience in Kenya, Zimbabwe and Tanzania has illustrated the challenge of 
encouraging competitive rivalry in network markets where one firm has a dominant, 
or even super-dominant, position and, therefore, has little incentive to open up its 
network to smaller competitors. The emerging experience of countries with such a 
market structure suggests that there may also be an incentive for firms to use their 
dominant position in the market, to pursue strategies to exclude and marginalise 
competitors. This is particularly problematic in mobile payments markets, where 
network effects and a dominant position in the market for traditional MNO services 
can easily be translated into a virtually unassailable position in the market for 
mobile payments. This, in turn, can be used to protect the incumbent’s position in 
the market for mobile services. The pricing analysis shows that, where there is a 
dominant incumbent, tariffs for mobile payments tend to be higher and reflect a 
wider gap between those for registered and unregistered customers, which has the 
effect of strengthening the incentives of existing customers to remain on the network 
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(including for traditional MNO services) and attracting new ones. While this pattern 
is beneficial for customers, the likely long-term consequences can be that the market 
tips towards the dominant player, denying rivals scale and reducing the incentives of 
the incumbent to innovate further and maintain competitive prices relative to rivals. 
Whilst investments made by the dominant incumbent in its network must 
be acknowledged and it must be allowed to make a reasonable return on such 
investments, there is a risk that, if left to themselves, such markets will tip towards 
sub-optimal equilibria. In the long term, the ability of new players to come into the 
mobile payments space and compete effectively for customers is important to ensure 
continued innovation, quality and low prices and, therefore, to preserve and extend 
the dynamic benefits to customers that have been discussed above. This will also have 
knock-on benefits, in terms of reducing barriers to entry and in terms of consumer 
switching in the market for mobile services. The results of the market structure and 
pricing analysis conducted in this study suggest that, in markets dominated by one 
large player, regulators may need to consider interventions to prevent the exclusion 
of competitors and to ensure the development of interoperability at all three levels, 
namely agent, platform and customer. This will be important in terms of levelling the 
playing field for competition.
Arising from the experiences of the three countries, a number of lessons can be 
drawn for regulators. Firstly, in Zimbabwe, a collaborative and adaptive approach by 
all three relevant regulators (the RBZ, POTRAZ and the Zimbabwean Competition 
and Tariff Commission (ZCTC)) has allowed for a timely response to competition 
concerns that have arisen. This process has also been undertaken in consultation with 
the relevant stakeholders, just as in Kenya, where the regulatory approach has also 
been iterative and inclusive. This approach is appropriate in an environment where 
the potential for competition concerns is high, particularly where there is a large 
dominant operator with limited incentives to interoperate. Secondly, it is important to 
balance the need for interventions to promote competition with the need to maintain 
incentives for investment by operators. The discussion above points to the fact that 
some large operators have invested substantially over time in improving the offering 
to customers and pursuing interoperability at an early stage in the development of 
the market may be counter-productive in terms of the growth of the market overall. 
In addition, in a more competitive market such as Tanzania, interoperability may 
develop between operators with strong encouragement by the regulators, although 
there may be some way to go in this regard. Importantly, the experiences highlighted 
above suggest that there is no one-size-fits-all solution for the regulation of mobile 
money markets, although it is clear that regulators should closely monitor the market 
as it develops and respond adaptively to competition concerns as they arise.
The issue of competitive dynamics in mobile payments markets and the implications 
for consumer outcomes is a relatively unstudied area, probably due to the novelty of 
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these markets and the scarcity of data pertaining to them. However, it is a highly 
topical area of interest for a number of countries, including the three we have 
discussed in this article, who are currently grappling with the appropriate regulatory 
approach to mobile payments markets, in order to promote competition, without 
dampening incentives for investment and innovation. This article has attempted to 
contribute to filling this gap by drawing together economic theory and available 
data on three countries. However, it has been limited by data availability. Further 
work in this area could seek to analyse more countries and consider in greater depth 
the developing dynamic rivalry between mobile payments and traditional modes 
of sending and receiving money, including the growing participation of banks as 
providers of overlapping services, particularly where detailed price data for the 
banking sector is available. 
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Appendix 1: Modelling the incentives for compatibility in industries with network effects 
As noted above, the model presented below is the same as that discussed by Motta (2004: 485 – 490) 
which is in turn based on that of Cremer, Rey and Tirole (2000). We first present the model as discussed 
by Motta (2004) and then use the model to illustrate one additional result. 
In a market with network effects there are two firms, Firm 1 and Firm 2 who each already have an 
installed base of customers: β1 and β2. Customers attach an intrinsic value � to the network. Therefore 
to the consumer, the net benefit from network product � is: 
�� = � + �� ��   (1) 
where ��  is network �’s price, and �� is the benefit to the customer from the network effect, given by: 
�� = ���� + �� + ���� + ����  (2) 
where �� and �� represent the number of new consumers buying from firm � and �, � <
�
�
 is a parameter 
(common to all consumers) that indicates the importance of the network externalities and ��[0,1] is a 
parameter that indicates the quality of interoperability between the two networks. If � = 0, there is no 
interoperability and if � = 1, there is full interoperability. Motta (2004) shows that in this situation, firm 
�’s demand function takes the form: 
�� = 1 + ���� +  ���� (1 �)�� (1 ��)�� (3) 
Assuming that each firm chooses output to maximise its profits, Motta (2004) shows that finding the 
intersection of the firms’ best reply functions gives the equilibrium of the game: 
�� =
�
�
�
�(���)��(���)(��� ��)
�(���)�(����)
+
(���)�(��� ��)
�(���)�(����)
� (4) 
Motta then sets ��=0 (so that the entrant has zero installed base) and � = 0 (to simplify the example) 
and considers whether Firm 1 and Firm 2 will be better off where � = 1 or � = 0. He finds that Firm 1 
will prefer full interoperability if: 
��(� = 1) ��(� = 0) =
�����������������
���
�(���)(��������)
> 0  (5) 
which is true for �� <
����
��������
. Thus when the incumbent has a much larger installed base than the 
entrant, the incumbent will only find it profitable to agree to interoperability if its installed base is small 
relative to potential (new) demand. On the other hand, if the installed base is large relative to potential 
demand, interoperability will make the incumbent worse off. The entrant is always made better off by 
agreeing to interoperability because: 
��(� = 1) ��(� = 0) =
������������������
���
�(���)(����)(����)
> 0  (6) 
In order to look at a further example relevant to our discussion, we set �� = �� to illustrate the situation 
when the two firms have the same installed base. Following Motta (2004), we also set � = 0. Firm 1 will 
prefer full interoperability when: 
��(� = 1) ��(� = 0) =
�������(���)�
�(���)(����)
> 0  (5) 
Expression (5) shows that in this model, where firms have the same size of installed base, they will 
always prefer full interoperability. 
 
